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Defendant-Appellee Epic Engineering, P.C (Epic), respectfully submits this 
brief in response to the Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Jason Ross (Ross). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Epic agrees with the Statement of Jurisdiction set forth in the Brief of 
Appellant. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the district court's decision to grant Epic's motion in limine 
precluding Ross's engineering expert from offering opinions on subject matters 
outside of his expertise, opinions that were contrary to Utah law, or opinions on 
issues that were undisputed, an abuse of discretion? 
Standard of Review: "A decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is left 
to the discretion of the district court, and that decision will not be reversed unless it 
constitutes an abuse of discretion." U.S.A. United Staffing Alliance, LLC v. 
Workers' Comp. Fund, 2009 UT App 160, f 17, 213 P.3d 20. An abuse of 
discretion occurs when the district court's decision "exceeds the limits of 
reasonability" or is based on a misinterpretation of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Eskelson ex rel Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, \ 5, 242 P.3d 
762. 
2. Did the district court err in dismissing Ross's breach of contract claim 
as a matter of law on the basis that Ross lacked expert evidence that would enable 
1 
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him to prove that Epic breached the parties' contract by failing to properly 
engineer the construction plans as Ross alleged? 
Standard of Review: A district court's ruling on a summary judgment 
motion is reviewed for correctness. Warenski v. AdvancedRVSupply, 2011 UT 
App 197,U 5, 257 P.3d 1096. 
3. Does the district court's decision to grant Epic's motion in limine 
excluding Ross's engineering expert prior to the time allowed for Ross to respond, 
where the issue of the expert's lack of qualifications was fully briefed by the 
Parties in connection with Epic's summary judgment motion, constitute harmless 
error such that reversal is not warranted? 
Standard of Review: In determining whether a procedural error is harmless, 
this Court asks whether the error is "sufficiently inconsequential so no reasonable 
likelihood exists that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Jones v. 
Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997). "In order to justify 
reversal the appellant must show error that was substantial and prejudicial in the 
sense there is at least a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of the error the 
result would have been different." Ortega v. Thomas, 383 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 
1963). 
2 
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STATEMENT Or THE CASE 
Ross entered into a contract with Epic for the design and engineering of a 
small commercial building that Ross planned to construct in Roosevelt, Utah. Epic 
delivered to Ross a stamped set of construction drawings and Ross hired his 
brother to construct the building. After the building was finished, it experienced 
settling that the parties agree is due to the presence of unconsolidated fill material 
underlying the site. Ross filed suit against Epic, asserting causes of action for 
breach of contract and negligence. In his complaint, Ross alleged vaguely that 
"Epic breached the contract by failing to properly engineer the [building] plans," 
but did not identify any specific shortcomings in Epic's performance. 
Both Ross and Epic retained local engineers to provide expert testimony on 
their behalf. Ross retained geotechnical engineer James. E. Nordquist, P.E. and 
Epic designated Larry Gilson, P.E., a structural engineer and licensed general 
contractor with 36 years of experience, as its standard of care expert. At the close 
of expert discovery, Epic moved for summary judgment on both of Ross's claims. 
Epic argued that Ross's negligence claim was barred by Utah's economic 
loss doctrine and that the breach of contract claim failed as a matter of law because 
Ross had not presented expert evidence demonstrating that Epic "failed to properly 
engineer the plans." Ross's engineering expert was not qualified to offer an 
opinion as to the standard of care governing Epic's performance and, in fact, had 
3 
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not attempted to do so. Ross opposed summary judgment, responding to Epic's 
challenge to his expert and attempting to raise issues of fact regarding the content 
of parties' agreement to preserve his breach of contract claim. Ross also cited to 
the "independent duty exception" to the economic loss doctrine in an attempt to 
prevent dismissal of his negligence claim. 
Judge Peterson granted Epic's motion in part, dismissing the negligence 
claim but denying summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. The parties 
were ordered to participate in mediation and when that effort was unsuccessful, the 
matter was scheduled for trial. Epic re-crafted its motion for summary judgment 
on the breach of contract claim into a motion in limine seeking to preclude Ross 
from presenting expert testimony from Mr. Nordquist to the jury. 
As Epic had previously argued, as a geotechnical engineer Mr. Nordquist 
lacked the relevant knowledge, skill, or experience that would enable him to testify 
as to the standard practices of structural engineers, contractors, or excavators. 
Therefore, Mr. Nordquist could not satisfy the threshold requirement of 
competency set forth by Utah Rule of Evidence 702. Moreover, Mr. Nordquist 
frankly admitted in his deposition that he did not have an opinion as to the relevant 
standard of care. The other opinions offered by Mr. Nordquist were unnecessary 
because they went to undisputed issues, such as the cause and extent of the settling 
and the appropriate method of repair. 
4 
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Judge Peterson heard argument on Epic's revived challenge to Mr. 
Nordquist's expert testimony at the final pre-trial hearing, over Ross's objection. 
Ruling from the bench, the district court exercised its broad discretion to evaluate 
expert testimony and granted Epic's motion in limine. The district court then 
revisited its earlier ruling denying summary judgment on the breach of contract 
claim, reasoning that without expert testimony Ross would be unable to establish 
that Epic breached the parties' contract by failing to meet the relevant standard of 
care. As a result, the dispute regarding the exact terms of the contract, upon which 
basis the district court had previously denied Epic's motion for summary 
judgment, was immaterial and did not prevent judgment as a matter of law. This 
appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts are undisputed, based on sworn testimony of the parties 
and their experts and facts that the parties agreed were undisputed. 
A. The U.S. Design Building Project. 
Ross contacted Epic in early 2006 to retain Epic's services for the design of 
a small commercial building that Ross intended to construct in Roosevelt, Utah 
(the U.S. Design Building). R.120 at f 1 (EpicUF); R.140 at 30:10-19 (J.Ross 
Dep.).1 Ross discussed his general needs and ideas for the U.S. Design Building 
1
 "J.Ross" refers to Jason Ross. "D.Ross" refers to David Ross. "J.Nordquist" 
5 
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with Adam Huff, P.E. (Huff), a structural engineer employed by Epic. R. 120 at f^ 2 
(EpicUF). Ross subsequently entered into a "Short Form Consulting Services 
Contract" (the Contract) with Epic for its design services. R.141-42 at 36:4-7; 
39:23-40:10 (J.Ross Dep.). 
The Contract defined Epic's scope of work as "structural engineering and 
drafting of 70' X 100' office and warehouse building" for a fee of $8,250.00. 
R.147; R.149 (Contract). It was Epic's position below that the Contract contained 
a second page of terms and conditions (Page 2), that included a limitation of 
liability clause and a standard of care provision that read, "Epic services shall be 
rendered without any warranty except that Epic will perform in accordance with a 
degree of care and skill generally exercised by professionals performing similar 
work under similar circumstance." R. 157. Ross denied ever receiving Page 2 of 
the Contract. R.142 at 39:2-10 (J.Ross Dep.). 
The construction plans that Epic delivered to Ross, designed by Adam Huff 
and bearing his stamp, contained general directions for the builder and instructions 
pertaining specifically to the compaction of the building site: "all footings shall 
bear 12" minimum into original undisturbed earth or on engineered fill. . . ." 
refers to James. E. Nordquist, P.E. uL.Gilson" refers to Larry Gilson, P.E. 
"RossUF" refers to Ross's claimed undisputed facts as accepted by Epic. 
"EpicUF" refers to Epic's claimed undisputed facts as accepted by Ross. 
"App.Brief' refers to the Opening Brief of Appellant Jason Ross. 
6 
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R. 122 at f 9 (EpicUF); R.176 (Construction Plans). Ross's brother, David Ross, 
served as the general contractor on the project. David Ross is not himself a 
licensed contractor; rather, he was operating under a license issued to Desert Rim 
Construction of St. George, Utah. R. 122-23 at ^ 10 (EpicUF); R. 143-44 at 61:20-
62:25; 65:1-8 (J.Ross Dep.). Ross's father also assisted with the excavation for the 
building's foundation. R. 123 at f 13 (EpicUF); R.172 at 21:7-15 (D.Ross Dep.). 
Ross moved into the U.S. Design Building in the Fall of 2006. 
Approximately ten months later, Ross notified Epic that the U.S. Design Building 
was experiencing settling and that cracks had appeared in the interior and exterior 
walls. R.123 at ffi[ 14-15 (EpicUF); R. 139 at 18:17-19 (J.Ross Dep.).2 Ross 
claimed that Epic should have performed a "soils report" in connection with the 
engineering of the U.S. Design Building. R.164 (J.Ross Dep. Ex. 16). Epic denied 
that the settling was due to any inadequacies in the engineering of the structural 
plans for the U.S. Design Building, which, again, specifically required that "all 
footings shall bear 12" minimum into original undisturbed earth or on engineered 
fill.. . ." or that a soils report was part of its scope of work under the Contract. Id. 
Ross's factual assertion that the building was built "according to the plans" 
designed by Epic is incorrect. App.Brief at 4. The plans specifically instructed that 
"all footings shall bear 12" minimum into original undisturbed earth or on 
engineered fill." R. 122 at f 9 (EpicUF); R.176. Yet, Ross conceded below that the 
cause of the settling was the unconsolidated fill material underlying the building 
site, R.722, and David Ross admitted that he made no efforts to determine whether 
the building site met the plans' specifications. R.123 at f^ 11 (Epic UF). 
7 
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Ross filed his complaint against Epic on January 23, 2008, raising causes of 
action for breach of contract and negligence. R.l-4. The only factual basis for 
Ross's breach of contract claim set forth in complaint is the allegation that "[Epic] 
breached the contract by failing to properly engineer the plans." R.3 at f 17. Epic 
answered the complaint, denying all liability. R.16-19. 
After the pleadings were filed, the parties jointly commissioned a 
geotechnical investigation by Intermountain GeoEnvironmental Services, Inc. 
(IGES) to definitively determine the cause of the settling. R. 178-86 (IGES Report). 
IGES evaluated the subsurface conditions around the U.S. Design Building by 
digging several test pits and reported that "[njumerous pieces of asphalt, concrete, 
and other debris were observed in each of the test pits." R.180 (IGES Report at 3). 
IGES concluded that the cause of the settling was insufficient compaction at the 
building site: "the footings for the [U.S. Design Building] were placed on 
undocumented, loosely placed fill material. Moisture later infiltrated the 
subsurface soils next to the structure, causing the fill soil to settle under foundation 
loads" R. 181 (IGES Report at 4). 
B. Mr. Nordquist's Expert Report. 
Ross retained geotechnical engineer James E. Nordquist, P.E. to provide 
expert testimony on his behalf. R.53-58 (Plaintiffs Expert Designations). Mr. 
Nordquist is president of Applied Geotechnical Engineering Consultants, Inc. and 
8 
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has specialized in geotechnical engineering since 1979. R.55-58 (J.Nordquist 
Report). Mr. Nordquist's expert opinions were as follows: i i 
• The building in question, more likely than not, is settling due to the 
densification of the underlying fill soil that is present under the 
building. 
• Extending support of the building through the fill, down in to the 
natural soil using piers, such as helical piers, under the subject 
building is an appropriate remedy to the settling and would provide 
suitable support of the building. 
• A licensed engineer looking at the lot in question, would (or should 
have been) immediately concerned about the obvious fill and the 
slope of the lot. 
• The building in question is settling far more than normal, and not 
just in one area, but through the footprint of the building. 
• It is not unreasonable for Jason Ross to believe that the term 
"structural engineering" on the Epic [contract] included being able 
to rely on the engineer for recommendations to be done to assure a 
stable building that would not settle. While Epic was not hired 
specifically to perform geotechnical engineering, it was hired to 
prepare the "stamped set of construction drawings" in order to 
obtain the building permit, and to design the structural aspects of 
the building. It is not unreasonable for Jason Ross to expect that 
this would include pointing out the possibility of problematic fill 
soil, based on the obvious fill present on the lot as set forth above. 
• When digging the footings a machine operator or contractor 
wouldn't necessarily be able to determine if the soil they were 
digging into was native or fill. 
R.55-56 (J.Nordquist Report at 1-2). 
Mr. Nordquist testified that geotechnical engineers "are typically involved in 
evaluating the subsurface soil conditions," including making "determinations of 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
compressibility, how strong it is, what impact water would have on it," in order to 
evaluate "what impact there would be of new construction," but that geotechnical 
engineers do not actually design buildings. R. 189-90 at 20:18-21:10 (J.Nordquist 
Dep.). With regard to his experience with excavation, Mr. Nordquist testified that 
his experience was limited to personally operating a backhoe on two occasions; 
once to grade a road on recreational property that he owns and once to install 
window wells at his home. R.501 (citing J.Nordquist Dep. at 14:20-16:4) 
Mr. Nordquist did not offer an opinion on the standard of care observed by 
structural engineers and, consequently, could not offer an opinion as to whether 
Epic met the relevant standard of care or otherwise "failed to properly engineer the 
plans" as Ross alleged. Mr. Nordquist testified that he "was asked to provide a 
cost estimate to evaluate whether or not [Epic] met the standard of care or at least 
to develop [his] opinion as to whether or not they met the standard of care." R.191 
at 50:19-51:9 (J.Nordquist Dep.). Mr. Nordquist submitted a proposal to Ross that 
estimated that such an opinion could be developed at a cost of $5,000.00. Id. The 
proposal stated that: 
In order to provide our professional opinion on the engineer's 
standard of care, we recommend that the standard of care prevailing at 
the time in question be established through investigation. 
Investigation would include the review of reports, records or opinions 
of other professionals performing the same or similar service at the 
time in question. With this in mind, we would propose to visit 
Roosevelt City and Vernal City building departments to review 
project files. 
10 
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R. 192-93 at 56:24-57:6 (J.Nordquist Dep.). Mr. Nordquist explained why this type 
of research was necessary in order for him to derive the applicable standard of 
care: 
Q. And did you think those project files would actually show you 
what the standard of care was? 
A. It would help significantly in what the standard of practice is in 
that area. 
Q. And how would it have helped significantly? 
A. If there were geotechnical reports on every project that was 
submitted, that would say a geotechnical report would be standard 
practice. 
R.566 at 68:7-14 (J.Nordquist Dep.). However, Mr. Nordquist never performed 
the project file review or the other work outlined in the proposal that he submitted 
to Ross: 
Q. Your testimony is that none of that was done? 
A. That's correct. 
R. 193 at 57:20-21 (J.Nordquist Dep.). 
Mr. Nordquist testified that he never received notice to proceed with the 
standard of care analysis that he proposed and that the work he performed in 
developing his "opinion letter" was limited to a visit to the U.S. Design Building 
and a level survey: 
Q. In terms of the work that you actually did on this project, did it 
end up being limited to the issue of the standard of care? 
A. It did not. 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. What else did it include? 
A. It did not include the standard of care. 
Q. Oh. What did it include, then? 
A. A site visit and a level survey. 
Q. So none of what is referenced here in the [proposal], none of that 
work was actually done? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Why did the work on the standard of care - why was that not 
done? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Who told you that you should not do that? 
A. I never received a notice to proceed. 
R.192-93 at 56:7-18; 58:1-5 (J.Nordquist Dep.). 
When the subject of the standard of care arose again during Mr. Nordquist's 
deposition, he testified as follows: 
Q. Why aren't you opining as to the standard of care as an engineer? 
A. The standard of care for this project is very important to 
recognize what happened in that locale with the local engineers at that 
time. That is not something that we have investigated. Our entire 
business is based on other engineers calling and asking for guidance 
and help in the geotechnical area. 
R.503 (citing J.Nordquist Dep. at 122:22-123:5). 
Mr. Nordquist also testified that, in his opinion, conducting a geotechnical 
study of the site prior to construction of the U.S. Design Building would have cost 
12 
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between $4,000 and $5,000, increasing Ross's engineering costs by fifty percent. 
R.191-93 at 52:22-53:13 (J.Nordquist Dep.). 
C. Mr. Gilson's Expert Report 
The expert designated by Epic was Larry Gilson, P.E., president of Gilson 
Engineering. R.73-74 (Defendant's Expert Disclosures). Mr. Gilson has over 36 
years of experience in both designing and supervising the construction of hundreds 
of commercial and residential projects. Mr. Gilson is also a licensed general 
contractor who has served as the city engineer for numerous Utah municipalities. 
R.81 (L.Gilson CV). 
In his expert report, Mr. Gilson states that he was retained to provide his 
professional opinion as to the standard of care that would be expected of structural 
engineers on a project similar to the U.S. Design Building; whether Epic met the 
standard of care in performing under the Contract with Ross; and whether the 
presence of concrete and other debris at the building site, as described by the IGES 
analysis, should have alerted the general contractor and principal excavator David 
Ross to the possibility of non-native soil or fill material. R.77 (L.Gilson Report at 
i). 
On the standard of care issue, Mr. Gilson opined that in his experience 
geotechnical studies are typically never ordered for light commercial structures, 
such as the U.S. Design Building, because of the expense involved. R.78 (L.Gilson 
13 
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Report at 2). Mr. Gilson also concluded that it was proper for Epic to use the 
minimum soil bearing capacity set forth in the International Building Code in lieu 
of data obtained from a geotechnical report in engineering Ross's building plans. 
R.78-79 (L.Gilson Report at 2-3). 
Mr. Gilson stated that the contours of the building site shown on the 
topographic survey do not necessarily indicate the presence of fill material and 
that, in any event, pursuant to the International Building Code it is the 
responsibility of the local building official to require a soils investigation if the 
official questions the suitability of the building site. R.79 (L.Gilson Report at 3). 
Further, Mr. Gilson concluded that any experienced excavator that encountered 
asphalt, concrete, and other debris while excavating for a foundation, as found in 
each of the test pits excavated by IGES, would have notified the structural engineer 
or contacted a geotechnical firm to investigate the site before continuing with the 
placement of the footings. Id. 
D. Epic's Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine to 
Exclude Mr. Nordquist's Testimony. 
At the close of discovery, Epic moved for summary judgment on both of 
Ross's claims. Epic argued that Ross's negligence claim was barred by the 
economic loss doctrine as articulated in Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB & G Eng 'g, 
Inc., 2010 UT 6, fflf 28-30, 230 P.3d 100, where Ross was seeking damages from 
Epic to repair the U.S. Design Building but conceded that a Contract existed 
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between the parties. R.209-12; R.254-56. The district court agreed, granting 
Epic's motion and dismissing the negligence claim. R.394 (Order). 
Epic's motion for summary judgment on Ross's breach of contract claim 
was premised on a failure of evidence. Specifically, Ross had not presented expert 
evidence in support of his allegation that "[Epic] breached the contract by failing to 
properly engineer the plans" or rebutted the expert evidence put forward by Epic. 
R. 131. Epic pointed to Mr. Nordquist's unequivocal testimony that he did not 
have an opinion as to the appropriate standard of care. R. 133. 
Epic further argued that although Mr. Nordquist opined that the contours of 
the building site should have "concerned" an engineer, without first establishing 
the appropriate standard of care, Mr. Nordquist could offer no assistance to the 
trier of fact as to what a structural engineer would have done in response to the 
alleged "concerns" or any other expert opinions that would tend to show that Epic 
failed to properly engineer Ross's plans. Id. Epic also questioned Mr. Nordquist's 
qualifications, arguing that Mr. Nordquist, who has specialized in geotechnical 
engineering for over thirty years, was unqualified to offer an expert opinion on the 
standard practices of structural engineers, contractors, or excavators. Id. 
Ross opposed Epic's summary judgment motion and responded to the 
challenge to his expert. It was Ross's position that the dispute over whether he 
received Page 2 of the Contract prevented the trial court from granting summary 
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judgment on the breach of contract claim. R.273-75. Ross argued that the 
standard of care was ambiguous and, therefore, "summary judgment regarding 
whether or not Epic breached or fulfilled that obligation [was] not appropriate." 
R.275. Ross also defended his expert's credentials, arguing that because Mr. 
Nordquist was a licensed engineer his opinion that it was not unreasonable for 
Ross to expect recommendations as to what should "be done to assure a stable 
building that would not settle" was admissible. R.276-77. 
The district court denied Epic's motion for summary judgment on the breach 
of contract claim, citing to disputed facts regarding the terms of the Contract and 
the "professional duty of care," and ordered the parties to participate in mediation. 
R.700-702; R.394-95 (Order). When the mediation was unsuccessful, the matter 
was scheduled for trial and Epic renewed its challenge to Mr. Nordquist's expert 
opinions. Epic filed a motion in limine to preclude Ross from presenting expert 
testimony from Mr. Nordquist on subject matters for which Mr. Nordquist was 
unqualified to act as an expert and redundant testimony on factual issues that were 
undisputed. R.491-92. Epic once again analyzed Mr. Nordquist's expert report and 
deposition testimony, which had been previously discussed by the parties in the 
briefing submitted in connection with Epic's summary judgment motion, in the 
context of Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. R.276-77. •:* 
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E. The District Court's Decision. 
At the final pre-trial hearing, Judge Peterson heard argument on Epic's 
motion in limine. R.712-737. Ross objected to the district court hearing argument 
prior to the time his written opposition to the motion in limine was due, but 
nonetheless offered his rebuttal to Epic's motion. R.720-30. Ross argued, citing 
back to his opposition to the motion for summary judgment on the breach of 
contract claim, that as a licensed engineer Mr. Nordquist was qualified to offer 
expert opinion on the standard of care observed by structural engineers. Id. Ross 
also argued that because the contents of the Contract were in dispute, his own 
testimony that he expected Epic to perform a soils study was sufficient to present 
that issue to the jury. R.726-728. 
Ruling from the bench, Judge Peterson granted Epic's motion in limine. 
R.734-36. The district court concluded that "[Mr. Nordquist] isn't going to be able 
to testify to the standard of care . . . . He would be testifying to something that is 
not relevant to the case." R.734. The district court also concluded that Mr. 
Nordquist's opinion that "a machine operator or contractor wouldn't necessarily be 
able to determine if the soil they were digging into was native or fill" was contrary 
to Utah law. R.736 (citing Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, fflj 18-19, 94 P.3d 919). 
Judge Peterson then stated that he had gone "back over the motions on 
summary judgment" and was revisiting his earlier decision. Id. The district court 
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explained that because Epic's expert testimony stood unrebutted, summary 
judgment would be granted: "The reason the Court did not grant summary 
judgment initially on the first issue was . . . the proffer that the expert[s] would 
disagree on critical issues. They don't." R.734. The district court rejected Ross's 
argument that a breach could be established via his own testimony or that Ross 
could "reform the contract unilaterally based upon his expectations." R.735. This 
appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT 
The district court acted well within its broad discretion in excluding the 
testimony of Ross's engineering expert. Mr. Nordquist is not qualified to offer an 
opinion and, in fact, expressed no opinion as to what standard of care governed 
Epic's performance under the parties' contract. Ross's argument on appeal that the 
trier of fact would first need to determine the terms of the parties' contract before 
expert testimony became relevant glosses over the central issue - that Ross lacked 
any admissible expert evidence that would enable him to establish a breach of the 
relevant standard of care. Consequently, Ross failed to meet his burden of 
presenting specific evidence demonstrating that there was a genuine issue for trial 
and summary judgment was appropriate. 
Further, Ross's protest regarding the district court's decision to rule on 
Epic's motion in limine prior to receiving a written response from Ross does not 
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justify reversal. The district court had already heard Ross's response to the 
challenge to his expert in connection with Epic's prior summary judgment motion. 
While Ross may have been able to fine tune his legal arguments in responding to 
the motion in limine, Mr. Nordquist's expert report and his unequivocal deposition 
testimony that he had no opinion on the standard of care were fixed. There is not a 
reasonable likelihood that the district court's ruling would have been different had 
Ross been permitted to submit a written opposition to the motion in limine. For 
these reasons, the decision below should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
L The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion or Misinterpret Rule 
702 in Excluding Ross's Expert. 
"It is within the discretion of the district court to determine the suitability of 
expert testimony in a case and the qualifications of the proposed expert." Ostler v. 
Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that 
the trial court properly excluded expert evidence based on pure conjecture). 
"Consequently, absent a clear abuse of this discretion, an appellate court will not 
reverse the trial court's determination." Grindstaffv. Grindstaff 2010 UT App 
261, f^ 8, 241 P.3d 365 (affirming exclusion of an expert witness that lacked 
relevant experience).3 
3
 Ross's brief first addresses the summary judgment decision and second, the 
district court's exclusion of his expert. But this Court's practice when reviewing 
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Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires a determination as to 
whether expert testimony is necessary to assist the trier of fact, and if so, whether 
the proposed expert has the requisite "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education" to provide such assistance to the trier of fact. Utah R. Evid. 702. The 
advisory committee notes make clear that Rule 702 "assigns to trial judges a 
'gatekeeper' responsibility to screen out unreliable expert testimony." Utah R. 
Evid. 702 advisory committee's note, f 3. When applying Rule 702, Utah courts 
should approach expert testimony with "rational skepticism." Id. 
A. Mr. Nordquist Was Not Qualified To Offer Expert Opinion On 
the Standard Practices of Structural Engineers, Contractors, or 
Excavators. 
In challenging the district court's decision, Ross argues that Mr. Nordquist is 
qualified to offer testimony on the standard practices of structural engineers, such 
as Epic, because he too is a licensed engineer. App.Brief at 19-20. Putting aside, 
for the moment, the fact that Mr. Nordquist testified that he did not have an 
opinion as to the appropriate standard of care, Utah law is clear that an expert from 
one professional specialty is not normally qualified to testify as to the standards of 
summary judgment decisions predicated on the exclusion of a party's expert is to 
review the admissibility of the expert testimony and then, after determining 
whether or not the exclusion was an abuse of discretion, the summary judgment 
decision. See, e.g. Brussow v. Webster, 2011 UT App 193, 258 P.3d 615 
(reviewing exclusion of plaintiff s expert prior to considering summary judgment 
ruling); Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, 141 P.3d 629 (same); Dikeo v. 
Osburn, 881 P.2d 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (same). 
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care required of a distinct, although related specialty. Burton v. Youngblood, 711 
P.2d 245, 247-249 (Utah 1985) (affirming exclusion of plaintiff s expert, an ocular 
plastic surgeon, in malpractice case against general plastic surgeon when the expert 
failed to establish that the practices observed a common standard of care). 
Utah courts have allowed an expert to offer standard of care testimony 
outside of his or her professional specialty only when a foundation is laid 
establishing that (1) the standards of care observed by the two specialties are the 
same; or (2) the expert is independently knowledgeable about the standard of care 
of the other specialty. See Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, \ 14, 982 P.2d 565 
(overturning the exclusion of physiatrist's testimony on the standard of care 
required of neurosurgeons where the expert laid a foundation establishing that the 
standard of care for both medical specialties was the same); Dikeo, 881 P.2d at 
946-48 (affirming exclusion of the testimony from an emergency room doctor who 
failed to show that the defendant cardiologist, that treated plaintiffs emergency 
heart condition, would observe the same standard of care). 
In this case, while both Mr. Nordquist and Adam Huff are licensed 
engineers, it is undisputed that Mr. Nordquist specializes in geotechnical 
engineering and not design or structural engineering. See supra at 8-9. According 
to Mr. Nordquist, geotechnical engineers "are typically involved in evaluating the 
subsurface soil conditions," including making "determinations of compressibility, 
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how strong it is, what impact water would have on it," in order to evaluate "what 
impact there would be of new construction," but that geotechnical engineers do not 
actually design buildings. R. 189-90 at 20:18-21:10 (LNordquist Dep.). 
Mr. Nordquist acknowledged that in order for him to have developed an 
opinion on the standard of care observed by structural engineers, such as Epic, he 
would have needed to conduct an investigation including the "review of reports, 
records or opinions of other professionals performing the same or similar service at 
the time in question." See supra at 10-12. It is clear, then, that Mr. Nordquist 
recognized that his experience as a geotechnical engineer did not qualify him to 
offer an opinion on the standard of care observed by structural engineers. As a 
geotechnical engineer, Mr. Nordquist does not possess the "knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education" that would enable him to offer expert testimony 
on the standard of care applicable to structural engineers nor did he establish that 
the standard of care for geotechnical engineers is the same. 
Similarly, Mr. Nordquist was unqualified to offer an expert opinion as to 
whether a contractor or machine operator would be able to determine if a building 
site contained fill material. Mr. Nordquist explained that his "opinion that a 
machine operator or contractor wouldn't necessarily be able to determine if the soil 
they were digging into was native or fill [was] based on [his] personal experience 
in determining if a soil mass is fill or naturally deposited." R. 199 (J.Nordquist 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Supp. Report at 3). Mr. Nordquist's experience in determining the composition of 
soil as a geotechnical engineer, however, has no corollary whatsoever to the 
experience of a general contractor or excavator. Mr. Nordquist testified that the 
sum total of his personal experience with excavation is comprised of two small 
projects that he undertook on his own property. See supra at 10. Mr. Nordquist's 
expert opinion on this topic was pure speculation and contrary to Utah law, as 
recognized by the district court, which "imputes to builders and contractors a high 
degree of specialized knowledge and expertise with regard to residential 
construction . . . In particular, builder-contractors are expected to be familiar with 
conditions in the subsurface of the ground." See Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 
Tfij 18-19, 94 P.3d919.4 
In sum, Ross failed to make the threshold showing of competency required 
by Utah Rule of Evidence 702 in order to present Mr. Nordquist to the jury as an 
expert witness on the specialized practices of structural engineers, contractors, or 
excavators. 
Ross misconstrues the decision below in arguing that the district court relied upon 
Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, to "absolve" Epic of liability. App.Brief at 18. 
Epic's position, that was adopted by the district court, is that Mr. Nordquist's 
opinion that "when digging the footings [for a building] a machine operator or 
contractor wouldn't necessarily be able to determine if the soil they were digging 
into was native or fill" is contrary to Utah law and, therefore, inadmissible. R.132; 
R.660 (Final Order). 
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B, Mr. Nordquist Never Articulated the Relevant Standard of Care 
Governing Epic's Performance. 
Mr. Nordquist testified unequivocally that he did not have an opinion as to 
the appropriate standard of care in this case. See supra at 10-12. As a result, Mr. 
Nordquist's opinion that the contours of the building site evidence the presence of 
fill that should have "concerned" an engineer (a proposition that Epic's expert 
disputes) is meaningless. First, as established above, Mr. Nordquist lacks the 
training or skill necessary for him to offer an opinion as to what conclusions a 
structural engineer might draw from the slope of a building site. Second, without 
articulating the applicable standard of care, Mr. Nordquist could not (and did not) 
opine as to what a structural engineer of ordinary care and skill would have done in 
response to the alleged "concerns." 
Ross argues on appeal that Mr. Nordquist's opinion that u[i]t is not 
unreasonable for Jason Ross to believe that the term 'structural engineering' on the 
[Contract] included being able to rely on the engineer for recommendations to be 
done to assure a stable building that would not settle" bears on the standard of care 
issue. App.Brief at 16. As Epic pointed out at the pre-trial hearing, testimony from 
Mr. Nordquist as to what was reasonable for Ross to believe lacks any foundation 
and simply is not expert opinion. R.719. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding Mr. Nordquist's unsupported opinions. 
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C. The Trial Court Properly Concluded that Mr. Nordquist's 
Remaining Expert Opinions Were Superfluous. 
Lastly, Mr. Nordquist's remaining opinions went to matters that were not in 
dispute: That the settling is due to the presence of unconsolidated fill material 
under the building, that the extent of the settling is beyond what would normally be 
expected, and that using helical piers to stabilize the building is an appropriate 
remedy. See supra at 9, 17. The district court properly exercised its broad 
discretion in excluding Mr. Nordquist's testimony on these uncontroverted issues 
as needlessly cumulative. 
II. The District Court's Dismissal of Ross's Breach of Contract Claim Was 
Correct and Should be Affirmed. 
Epic, as the party moving for summary judgment on an issue that Ross had 
the burden to prove at trial, Le. that Epic breached the parties' contract by failing to 
properly engineer the plans, satisfied its burden on summary judgment by showing, 
by reference to the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Warenski v. 
AdvancedRVSupply, 2011 UT App 197, % 5, 257 P.3d 1096 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). Upon such a showing, the burden shifted to Ross, the nonmoving party, 
who "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings," but 
"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. 
(quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 
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A, Ross Could Not Prevail On His Breach of Contract Claim 
Without Expert Testimony Establishing the Relevant Standard of 
Care. 
On appeal Ross asserts that it was not necessary for him to establish a 
standard of care to prevail on his breach of contract claim and that the dispute over 
the exact terms of the Contract precluded summary judgment. App.Brief at 16-17. 
While Ross's position is somewhat difficult to discern, he appears to argue that the 
jury must first determine whether Page 2, containing the limitation of liability and 
standard of care provisions, is a part of the Contract. Only then, Ross argues, 
would expert testimony become potentially relevant. Id 
The flaw in Ross's reasoning is that the fundamental basis for his breach of 
contract claim was the allegation that Epic "failed to properly engineer the plans." 
Because the average juror has little understanding of what is required to properly 
engineer building plans, expert testimony is required to establish the relevant 
standard of care and then evaluate Epic's performance against that standard. See 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("where 
the average person has little understanding of the duties owed by particular trades 
or professions, expert testimony must ordinarily be presented to establish the 
standard of care"). As noted by this Court in Wycalis, "expert testimony has been 
required to establish the standard of care for medical doctors, Chadwick v. Nielsen, 
763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); architects, Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher 
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& Assocs., 467 P.2d 610, 615 (Utah 1970); and engineers, National Housing 
Indus., Inc. v. EL. Jones Dev. Co., 576 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978)." Id. 
The fact that Ross's claim is premised on contract law and not tort does not 
change the analysis. Once Mr. Nordquist's testimony was excluded, the testimony 
of Epic's expert, Mr. Gilson, that Epic met the standard of care observed by 
structural engineers on similar projects in using the minimum soil bearing capacity 
set forth in the International Building Code in lieu of data obtained from a 
geotechnical report in engineering Ross's plans stood unrebutted. R.79. As the 
district court properly concluded, Ross lacked any admissible evidence to support 
his allegation that Epic "breached the contract by failing to properly engineer the 
plans" to present at trial and summary judgment was appropriate. 
The Arizona case of National Housing Indus., Inc. v. E.L. Jones Dev. Co, 
cited favorably by this Court in Wycalls v. Guardian Title of Utah, is particularly 
instructive here. In National Housing, an engineering firm was retained to prepare 
a subdivision plat and associated paving, sewer, water, drainage and grading plans 
for the development of real property later acquired by the plaintiff. 576 P.2d at 
1376. The plaintiff brought suit against the engineering firm, alleging that it had 
failed to meet the appropriate standard of care by not including a "cut and fill" 
estimate as part of the subdivision design that would have disclosed that 20,000 
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cubic yards of fill material would have to be imported before homes could be built 
on the property in question. Id. at 1377. 
The defendant engineering firm introduced expert testimony establishing 
that the standard of care in that locale did not include cut and fill estimates as part 
of the standard engineering fee for designing a subdivision. Id. The plaintiff failed 
to offer any contradictory expert evidence, and the Arizona Court of Appeals 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the engineering firm, holding that the 
plaintiff failed, as a matter of law, to raise an issue of fact as to the standard 
engineering practices with respect to preparing "cut and fill" estimates. Id. at 1378. 
The same result is required here. Ross failed to rebut the expert testimony 
offered by Mr. Gilson that in his extensive experience geotechnical studies are 
typically never ordered for light commercial structures, such as the U.S. Design 
Building and, in addition, that the gradation of the building site was not necessarily 
indicative of fill. R.78 (L. Gilson Report at 1). Without admissible expert 
testimony Ross could not, as a matter of law, raise an issue of fact as to Epic's 
performance under the Contract and the district court's conclusion that the dispute 
over Page 2 was immaterial is correct. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Revising Its 
Earlier Ruling Denying Epic's Summary Judgment Motion, 
Ross argues that there was no basis for the trial court to reconsider its prior 
ruling that the dispute over the Contract terms prevented summary judgment. This 
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Court reviews the issue of the trial court's reconsideration of a prior ruling for an 
abuse of discretion. See IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & KMgmt, Inc., 2008 UT 73, 
TJ 27, 196 P.3d 588 ("reconsideration of an issue before a final judgment is within 
the sound discretion of the district court"). 
At the final pre-trial hearing, the district court explained that "You [Ross] 
relied heavily on your expert to substantiate that there was dispute in fact. Now 
I've got the expert who is in question here." R.725. The district court asked Ross 
for clarification as to what duty Epic had under the contract. R.722. When Ross 
was unable to point to any specific duty (or specific failure), the district court 
explained that because Epic's expert testimony stood unrebutted summary 
judgment would be granted. "The reason the Court did not grant summary 
judgment initially on the first issue was . . . the proffer that the expert[s] would 
disagree on critical issues. They don't." R.734. 
The district court rejected Ross's argument that a breach could be 
established via his own testimony or that Ross could "reform the contract 
unilaterally based upon his expectations." R.735. There was no abuse of discretion 
in the trial court's decision to reconsider his earlier ruling on the standard of care 
issue. 
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III. The District Court's Grant Of Epic's Motion in Limine Prior To 
Receiving a Response from Ross Does Not Warrant Reversal. 
The district court issued its ruling on the motion in limine prior to the 
deadline set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c) for Ross to submit a written 
response had expired. The error, however, was harmless and there is no reasonable 
likelihood that a written opposition to the motion in limine would have affected the 
final outcome. 
In determining whether a procedural error is harmless, this Court asks 
whether the error is "sufficiently inconsequential so no reasonable likelihood exists 
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Jones v. Cyprus Plateau 
Mining Corp,, 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997). "In order to justify reversal the 
appellant must show error that was substantial and prejudicial in the sense there is 
at least a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of the error the result would 
have been different." Ortega v. Thomas, 383 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1963). 
Ross argues on appeal that had he been allowed to submit a formal response 
to the motion in limine, he would have presented details regarding the "expert's 32 
years of experience dealing with settlement issues (including numerous 
interactions with structural engineers)... as well as the expert's specific 
knowledge and expertise regarding the specific facts of this case." App.Brief at 10. 
But Ross's argument would have this Court ignore Mr. Nordquist's own testimony 
that he did not have an opinion on the relevant standard of care and that developing 
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an opinion would have required substantial investigation on his part that he was 
never authorized to perform and did not perform. See supra at 10-12. 
Moreover, Ross cannot claim prejudice when he had a full opportunity to 
respond to the challenge to his expert in opposing Epic's summary judgment 
motion. The basis for both Epic's summary judgment motion on the breach of 
contract claim and the motion in limine was the inadequacy of Ross's expert 
evidence, as Ross emphasized at the final pre-trial hearing: "They [Epic] made 
that same argument in their summary judgment motion. The exact same argument 
was there." R.730. The contents of Mr. Nordquist's expert report and his 
deposition testimony did not change in the interim. Perhaps Ross could have 
attempted to present his expert in a better light in responding to the motion in 
limine, but the substance of Mr. Nordquist's opinions and his deposition testimony 
could not be altered. There is not a reasonable likelihood that receiving further 
briefing on the motion in limine would have affected the district court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is about misplaced blame. The construction plans that Epic 
delivered to Ross were not faulty. The U.S. Design Building failed because it was 
not constructed according to the building plans that specified that the footings 
should be placed into undisturbed earth or on engineered fill. Ross failed to put 
forward any admissible evidence that Epic bore responsibility for the contractor's 
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failure to ascertain the subsurface conditions. Accordingly, and for all the reasons 
stated above, this Court should affirm the district court's entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Epic. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of November, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Brent E. Johnson 
Rebecca A. Ryon 
Attorneys for Epic Engineering. P.C. 
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